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Abstract
This article locates Fredric Jameson’s Allegory and Ideology (2019) in the context of 
the broader trajectory of his career-long critique of the bourgeois centred subject. 
It argues that, for Jameson, the project of critique requires systematic depersonali-
sation at the level of thought. Contrary to negative liberal humanist interpretations 
of depersonalisation, Jameson stresses its hidden, revolutionary potential. Where his 
earlier work eschewed metanarratives of modernity premised upon shifts in subjectiv-
ity, preferring conjunctural or situational analyses, his more recent work – Antinomies 
of Realism (2013) and Allegory and Ideology in particular – develops a materialist ver-
sion of just such metanarratives. The article concludes with a detailed application of 
Jameson’s allegorical method to the figure of the ‘person’ under capitalism, which can 
be sub-divided into the four levels of: individual, citizen/juridical person, infrastruc-
tural personifications, and the realm of social reproduction.
Keywords
Jameson – allegory – personhood – depersonalisation – impersonality – social 
reproduction – citizenship – realism
…
It would be tempting, indeed, to go on to show
how even the forms of modern literary criticism are
unable to evade the dynamic of depersonalisation.
fredric jameson, A Singular Modernity
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1 The Jamesonian Impersonal
The ‘person’, viewed negatively, is the experiential corollary of reification: the 
lived modality of the monad amidst the alien tundra of capital’s second nature. 
For Fredric Jameson, the cultural dominance of the personal under capitalism 
is precisely that which prevents the re-imagination of a collective revolutionary 
horizon, or which serves (ideologically and representationally) to re-contain 
the latter’s periodic resurgence within ‘the privacy and elbowroom of Western 
middle-class society’.1 In ‘Third-World Literature in the Age of Multinational 
Capitalism’ – reprinted in Allegory and Ideology – a strict division between 
the personal, private realm and the public world is associated with the fully 
capitalist nation-states of the then First World, imbuing Jameson’s critique of 
the ‘mirage of the “centred subject” and the unified personal identity’ with an 
anti-imperial edge.2 (It will be recalled that it is precisely the lack of this clear 
split between private and public in the partially capitalised states of the then 
Third World that was said to generate ‘national allegories’: the representational 
result of the structural overdetermination of the personal by the political.) 
One of the implicit and persistent presuppositions of Jameson’s work is that 
critique, which itself presupposes a sense of historicity and collective political 
possibility, requires systematic depersonalisation at the level of thought. It is 
this presupposition, along with the style in which he has forged it, that I refer 
to as the Jamesonian impersonal.3 
The flipside of such critique is a dialectical transvaluation of the very notion 
of ‘depersonalisation’, a brief account of which may prove useful in setting 
out the larger problematic of which Allegory and Ideology is the most recent 
iteration. If from a liberal humanist perspective ‘depersonalisation’ signals 
authoritarianism or some privative and humanly-diminishing force, Jameson 
reveals its hidden radical or representational potential. Writing on modernist 
impersonality in A Singular Modernity (2002), for instance, Jameson explains 
he wants to show 
1 Jameson 1971, p. 305.
2 Jameson 2019, p. 161. 
3 For an account of Jameson’s theory of style, see Hartley 2017; on Jameson’s own style, see 
Eagleton 2009.
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everything that is energizing and active about a depersonalizing ten-
dency that has too often been discussed in terms of loss and incapacita-
tion; in demonstrating how such a renunciation of subjectivity, far from 
amounting to some resignation to an impossibly ‘alienating’ condition, 
stands on the contrary as an original and productive response to it.4
Drawing on Perry Anderson’s ‘Modernity and Revolution’ (1984), Jameson reads 
‘the great modernist evocations of subjectivity’ not as symptoms of the much-
touted modernist ‘inward turn’ but rather as ‘allegorical of the transformation 
of the world itself, and therefore of what is called revolution’: ‘a longing for 
depersonalization, and very precisely for some new existence outside the self, 
in a world radically transformed and worthy of ecstasy.’5 Allegory here names 
the mediating process by which (objective) revolutionary change is transposed 
into (subjective) figures of transformation. The model is Sartre’s account of 
the gravitational ‘action at a distance’ effected by the Marxist masses upon the 
petit-bourgeois intellectual, but one might also think of Kant, Hegel, and the 
early Marx faced with the spectacle of the French Revolution – the emergent 
deutsche Misère now recast as allegorical figuration and frustration. 
Yet here we encounter a problem of which Jameson himself is well aware. 
The virtue of Anderson’s account is that it is conjunctural – and it was Jameson’s 
conscious decision in A Singular Modernity to adopt a conjunctural approach 
(though he prefers the Sartrean term ‘situation’) to modernism as opposed to 
reproducing the myriad ideological metanarratives of modernity’s emergence. 
The third of Jameson’s four ‘maxims of modernity’ reads: ‘The one way not to 
narrate [modernity] is via subjectivity (thesis: subjectivity is unrepresentable). 
Only situations of modernity can be narrated.’6 The dangers of narratives pre-
mised upon subjectivity are evident. Either modernity becomes an idealist tale 
of the rise of freedom, individuality and self-reflexivity, or a mournful narrative 
of Spenglerian decline, Weberian disenchantment, or some more pervasive 
‘alienation’. Jameson has always opted for a situational approach in which each 
‘situation’ is, at its limit, coextensive either with a given mode of production 
or, more commonly, with a particular stage of development of a given mode of 
production (e.g., his work on the rise and decline of modern style can roughly 
be narrated thus: market capitalism–realism–rhetoric, monopoly capitalism–
modernism–style, late capitalism–postmodernism–styleless-ness). Each stage 
constitutes a situation with a unique ‘cultural dominant’ that any literary or 
4 Jameson 2002, pp. 132–3; my emphasis.
5 Jameson 2002, p. 136.
6 Jameson 2002, p. 94.
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artistic production must negotiate as it sees fit.7 The strength of this approach 
is that it allows the critic to reconstruct a whole range of different cultural 
productions as ‘responses’ to a single situation, and in doing so to imbue them 
with the proactivity of a gesture or an act. The problem – both theoretical 
and representational – then becomes how one conceives of transitions from 
one situation (or mode of production) to the next without falling back into 
idealist metanarratives.
Jameson’s elegant solution to this problem has always been ‘cultural revo-
lution’ (indeed, the chapter dedicated to the topic in Valences of the Dialectic 
(2009) reads like a set of preparatory notes for a book one hopes Jameson will 
one day write). At any one moment, several modes of production coexist – 
structured in dominance – in a social formation: ancient relics and Utopian 
prefigurations rustle and stir amidst the dull compulsion of the capitalist 
value-form. ‘Cultural revolution’ names the moment at which this coexistence 
becomes openly antagonistic – the Enlightenment as bourgeois cultural revo-
lution being Jameson’s principal case in point. What Jameson’s recent work 
offers is, then, something akin to a series of miniature studies of the effects of 
cultural revolution on literary production and subjectivity (like Günter Grass, 
he is ‘a miniaturist, albeit a maximalist one’).8 It is here that his situational con-
ception of modernist depersonalisation gives way – in line, perhaps, with cul-
tural revolution being itself a dynamic, diachronic process – to a narrative of 
modern depersonalisation. That is, Antinomies of Realism (2013) and Allegory 
and Ideology (2019) harbour precisely those metanarratives of subjectivity that 
it was previously Jameson’s express wish to avoid – though they are anything 
but conventional (and anything but idealist).9 
Antinomies of Realism tells the story of a gradual process of literary deper-
sonalisation from realism (a delicate balance of récit and affect) to modernism 
(affect’s victory): from Zola’s characters who become ‘the most perfunctory 
pretexts for what is virtually an autonomous unfolding of sense data’,10 through 
Tolstoy’s restless shifts in mood in which the true characters become the very 
affects – and their variations – themselves, on through the waning of prota-
gonicity in Galdós (whereby putative heroes and heroines recede into the 
background and give way to ‘minor’ or ‘secondary’ characters), to George Eliot 
whose invention of mauvaise foi avant la lettre narratively deconstructs the 
7  Jameson 1981, p. 6.
8  Jameson 2019, p. 320.
9  It should be noted that Jameson is well aware of this – citing his own previous warnings 
regarding narratives of subjectivity from A Singular Modernity. Jameson 2019, p. 71, n. 26.
10  Jameson 2013, p. 59.
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ethical binary of Good and Evil that is the ultimate ideological habitat of the 
‘personal’. In a quite astonishing manoeuvre, then, Jameson pulls the ideologi-
cal rug from under us. For it is not simply that the now-mythical ‘bourgeois 
individual’ (of whom sightings are as rare as of the Loch Ness monster) eventu-
ally succumbs to ‘the death of the subject’ in postmodernity: it turns out that 
the bourgeois subject never existed in the first place! Jameson has chased it 
out even of the very locus classicus it was said representationally to inhabit: the 
realist novel itself. The new hegemony of ‘everyday life’ with its anti-heroic ten-
dencies and temporalities, and the rise of a general consciousness of universal 
claims to social equality are said to exert a depersonalising pressure upon the 
characterological fabric of the novel. Jameson effectively hollows out the once-
fêted bourgeois individual, leaving only the husk of a ‘character’s name and 
place in the action’.11
The reader of Allegory and Ideology is then somewhat surprised to learn that 
many of the qualities associated with the ‘bourgeois individual’ – e.g., interior-
ised subjectivity and self-consciousness – have been rediscovered elsewhere: 
not in nineteenth-century Paris or London, but all the way back in the Roman 
Empire! In a majestic reconstruction of the social life-worlds from which the 
respective emotional systems of the Greek polis and the Roman Empire are 
said to have emerged, Jameson locates the origins of the ‘construction of sub-
jectivity’ in the universal Empire itself – with its vast, culturally diverse pop-
ulations whose subjects are said to enjoy a ‘kind of equality’ ‘in the face of 
that lone supreme Subject who is the emperor (until his structural place is 
taken by God himself)’.12 Like some pan-imperial panopticon – signalling a 
Sartrean twist on Foucauldian themes (surveillance, Christian care of the self, 
population) – this ‘omnipresent Other … permits a new kind of introspection’ 
that inspires a codification of the emotions as sins for the first time.13 Yet pre-
cisely because of the imperial context comprising vast class and cultural diver-
sity, the formulation of this internal space becomes an allegorical figuration 
of the external spaces of empire: ‘a systemic review of social positions link-
ing characterology with external class and geographical (ethnic) positions’.14 
Jameson then reads this shift from the limited dynamics of the Greek polis to 
the scale of the Roman empire as analogous to our ‘contemporary supersession 
of the national by globalization.’15 
11  Jameson 2013, p. 84.
12  Jameson 2019, pp. 70–1.
13  Jameson 2019, pp. 78–9.
14  Jameson 2019, p. 79.
15  Ibid. 
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When faced with arguments of such dizzying epic scope, one has to allow 
for a certain strategic use of exaggeration and simplification (not quite 
Adorno’s ‘[i]n psychoanalysis nothing is true except the exaggerations’, but not 
far off it). In his classic pincer-movement, Jameson undermines the unity of 
the individual subject from within (deconstructing it into so many emotions 
or affects) and without (rewriting the individual as an allegorical figuration of 
a collective system). If Antinomies of Realism told the story of the transition 
to modern(ist) depersonalisation, Allegory and Ideology narrates ‘the disap-
pearance of personification that signals the emergence of modernity’:16 the 
(bourgeois) ‘person’, which should logically be situated between the end of one 
narrative and the start of the next, is then nowhere to be found – a vanishing 
mediator.17 If for Derrida it is always too late to talk about time, for Jameson 
it is always too late (or too early!) to talk about the ‘centred subject’.18 Instead, 
the book develops a theory of subject formation as a process of naming and 
reification (most powerfully in the chapter on Spenser), in which some inter-
nal affective, psychic raw material is (re)organised into a named ‘system of 
nouns and substantives’: ‘a blind groping about the informe, the inchoate, the 
primal and unorganized, with a view to separating its masses of heterogeneous 
materials, collecting them, designating them with a name and identification’.19 
As in Gramsci’s notion of the persona, a discontinuous composite of ‘preju-
dices from all past phases of history at the local level and intuitions of a future 
philosophy’,20 the inner life of the Jamesonian subject is a decentred amal-
gam of residual and emergent emotional systems and affective fluctuations. 
Likewise, it is always overdetermined by ‘laterality’ and ‘transversality’ – those 
discontinuous intersections between the various allegorical levels, whose 
isotopie (in this case, the allegorical precondition of the centred subject) is 
never assured. 
16  Jameson 2019, p. 48.
17  It is not coincidental that Jameson’s arguably most-sustained engagement with the cat-
egory of ‘personality’ comes in the very essay ‘The Vanishing Mediator’ itself, with its vir-
tuoso account of Weber’s personality-formation. See Jameson 2008, pp. 309–43.
18  Even in the now-canonical chapter on Balzac in The Political Unconscious we discover ‘a 
psychic situation in which the centred subject has not yet emerged’. Jameson 1981, p. 179.
19  Jameson 2019, p. 243.
20  Gramsci 1971, p. 324.
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2 Person as Allegory
Given Jameson’s justifiable antipathy to liberal notions of ‘personhood’, it may 
now come as something of a surprise if I suggest that his fourfold allegori-
cal method enables us to map the allegorical structure of personhood under 
capitalism. That is, rather than agree or disagree with this or that reading in 
Allegory and Ideology – the vast sweep of which only he would dare (from the 
Greek polis to postmodernity) – it seems to me more productive to honour 
Jameson’s own penchant for the Brechtian Nützliches (what he elsewhere calls 
that ‘garage space in which all kinds of machinery can be tinkered with and 
rebuilt’)21 by putting this particular bit of theoretical kit to use. We can begin 
by noting that the very concept of the ‘person’ bears within it traces of a range 
of previous cultural revolutions. Marcel Mauss charted its trajectory from the 
tribal ‘role’ (limited in number) to the Roman persona – a mask or character in 
a dramatic play, or a legal subject entitled to the inheritance of an estate (only 
the pater familias qualified as a ‘person’) – via the Stoics and Christians to the 
modern bourgeois person who is said to be ‘conscious, independent, autono-
mous, free and responsible’.22 (Mauss even mentions the tantalising possibility 
that the revolt of the plebs was decisive in the universalisation of the status 
of persona beyond the privileged patres familias.)23 In modern times, the con-
cept hovers between two meanings: a social role unconnected to subjective 
interiority (as in Hobbes) and the self-conscious ‘moral person’ (as in Locke 
and Kant). Jameson’s method allows us to sublate this duality and reconstruct 
the ‘person’ as a fourfold allegory, which we shall map onto a Greimasian 
square (see Figure 1) in line with Jameson’s suggestive claim that there exists 
some secret affinity between the square and the structure of allegory itself.24
I shall argue that each of the four levels of the ‘person’ is centred upon 
one or more ‘figures of subjectivity’: sites of struggle between subjection and 
subjectivation.25 For though I agree in many respects with Jameson’s narrative 
of modern depersonalisation, my own account would emphasise its dialectical 
complement: the continued centrality of a set of structural personae that are 
21  Jameson 2005, p. 14.
22  Mauss 1985.
23  Mauss 1985, p. 16.
24  I am grateful to Natalya Bekhta and Gero Guttzeit for their help in plotting this particular 
Greimasian square.
25  I am drawing here on Sandro Mezzadra, the subtitle of whose book In the Marxian 
Workshops: Producing Subjects is obviously relevant to Jameson’s notion of the ‘construc-
tion of subjectivity’. See Mezzadra 2018.
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intrinsic to capital accumulation.26 Let us begin with the contraries, adapted 
from Jameson’s distinction in ‘Third-World Literature’: personal and public. 
We shall call the former ‘individual’: the personal, private and intimate realm. 
It is the existential modality of the flesh-and-blood human being – the hop-
ing, dreaming, anxious, suffering individual of whose life Che Guevara once 
declared that it is worth ‘millions of times more than all the property of the 
richest man on earth’. Conceptually speaking, it denotes (to adopt a more tech-
nical jargon) the individuated instance of a given ‘differential form of histori-
cal individuality’ – i.e., all individuals are transindividual constructions (even 
26  I should note that my focus here is on so-called ‘Western’ (or formerly ‘First World’) social 
formations. I have considered the dynamics of personhood in postcolonial social forma-
tions in Hartley 2019b.
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here, we seek to avoid the liberal humanist temptation).27 Yet ultimately it also 
names something like a political and representational demand: the urgent 
reality that cries out to be seen and heard beyond all the veils of ideology, the 
layers of reified response and the limitations of existing cultural forms.
Its contrary is then the collective world of the public, which we may trans-
code as the arena of interpellation.28 (It is perhaps not coincidental that 
recent work on interpellation has suggested we understand it as a process of 
personification.)29 Marx’s ‘On the Jewish Question’ will serve as our guide here, 
for it was precisely his argument that modern nation-states internally divide 
their subjects into man (l’homme) – ‘the real man … in his sensuous, indi-
vidual, and immediate existence’ – and the citizen (le citoyen), which he tell-
ingly describes as ‘simply abstract, artificial man, man as an allegorical, moral 
person’, i.e., as one of Jameson’s ‘bad’ allegories.30 Given Jameson’s propensity 
to warn against the desire for unification,31 we note with interest that it was 
Marx’s aim at this time to sublate the allegorical division between civil and 
political society: ‘Only when real, individual man resumes the abstract citizen 
into himself … will human emancipation be completed.’32 The primary sub-
jective figure of this level is thus that of the citizen, but as no end of ‘humani-
tarian’ disasters have since reminded us, it is intimately bound up with the 
correlative figure of the rights-bearing juridical person (which developed 
as the legal counterpart to the commodity-form, as Pashukanis famously 
argued).33 It fell to Arendt to articulate the fatal aporia of the man–citizen 
binary: ‘The Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforce-
able … whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any sovereign 
state.’34 This level is thus the site of all those struggles over citizenship (‘the 
right to have rights’), legal rights, national identity, border regimes and autono-
mous mobility.
Yet just as Marx in Capital invokes the Dantean katabasis, descending from 
the veritable Eden of equal rights into the inferno of the hidden abode of pro-
duction, so must we, in our Greimasian square, descend from the luminous 
27  Cf. Balibar 2015b, p. 417, and Sève 2015.
28  Albeit I heed Althusser’s warning that it is the capitalist state itself that determines the 
precise distribution of public and private. 
29  See Balibar 2015a and Lecercle 2019.
30  Marx 1975, p. 234.
31  See, for example, his rejection of Gramsci’s defence of the total unity of Canto X of Dante’s 
Inferno against Croce’s critique. Jameson 2019, pp. 263–4.
32  Marx 1975, p. 234.
33  Pashukanis 1978.
34  Arendt 2004, p. 372. On the narrative implications of Arendt’s conception of the legal 
person, see Hartley 2019a.
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realm of the citoyen to the shadowy underworld of the Charaktermasken. This 
is the realm of work and the economy in which the empirical individual and 
juridical person give way to what we might call infrastructural personifica-
tions: those points in the system at which the fundamental social relations of 
production are concentrated and imposed – like an iron mask – upon subjec-
tive ‘bearers’ (Träger). ‘[T]he characters who appear on the economic stage 
[die ökonomischen Charaktermasken der Personen]’, writes Marx, ‘are merely 
personifications of economic relations; it is as the bearers of these economic 
relations that they come into contact with each other.’35 The section of the 
Grundrisse entitled ‘Forms which precede capitalist production’ reads like a 
veritable summa of the various pre-capitalist permutations of such personifi-
cations, but the pair that concerns us here is: capital and labour-power. These 
are the twin figures that the capitalist valorisation process produces and pre-
supposes; they are the outcome of that deeply allegorical process known as 
‘alienation’, which combines the separation of living labour from the objective 
conditions of labour with the personification of those conditions in the person 
of the capitalist – ‘a personification with its own will and interest’.36 In the 
process, the worker becomes herself internally divided between two corporeal 
and existential tendencies.37 Capital posits the worker as an unaccommodated 
body, a mere repository of labour-power separated from all that sustains life 
(Spenser’s Malbecco, in whom ‘the concentration of the mind on a single emo-
tion has wasted the rest of the human substance’, now stands as a prefigura-
tion of the worker possessed by capital’s unremitting zeal).38 Meanwhile, the 
worker posits herself as an inherently meaningful person with a rich and varie-
gated inner life engaged in any number of relationships and life projects. This 
is one of the fundamental contradictions of capitalist societies: the struggle 
between the capitalist law of value and what Lucien Sève has named the ‘order 
of the person’, his ingenious term for what we might call an anti-capitalist law 
of value: the ‘value form inherent to each human being’ (not, incidentally, some 
idealist abstraction – as Marx criticised in the sixth thesis on Feuerbach – but 
the hard-won, accumulated common sense of what Raymond Williams would 
call ‘the long revolution’).39 
This now leaves some hazy fourth level whose very obscurity is symptom-
atic of its marginalisation in capitalist societies. I shall call it the level of social 
35  Marx 1990, p. 179.
36  Marx 1973, p. 452.
37  I have expanded upon this idea in Hartley 2018.
38  Jameson 2019, p. 237.
39  Cf. Sève 2006, pp. 51–6.
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reproduction: the realm of care work, domestic labour, the family, friendship, 
and work beyond the zone of commodification. It is well known that in addi-
tion to extinguishing the phenomenal distinction between necessary and sur-
plus labour, the wage-form also extinguishes the role of unwaged labour in 
the valorisation process. Marxist feminists, as in the ‘Wages for Housework’ 
movement, have struggled against this devaluation of what remains primarily 
women’s work (including within the Marxist tradition itself). Yet the logic of 
the square suggests that they are also structurally related to the categories of 
‘non-citizen’ and ‘non-juridical person’, thus immediately bringing into view 
(in some Jamesonian anagnorisis) a vast hinterland of ‘illegal immigrants’, 
migrant workers, labourers in the ‘informal economy’, ‘surplus populations’, 
the ‘reserve army of labour’, and refugees. It is telling indeed that this level, 
unlike its three predecessors, fails easily to coalesce around a single figure 
of subjectivity: under capitalism, it seems, the only thing worse than being 
personified is not being personified. Its most typical figure (in a nigh-on 
Lukácsian sense) would perhaps be the migrant woman care-worker: socially 
reproducing ‘Western’ subjects, on the margins of the formal economy, ever at 
the mercy of racist border regimes.40
Such, then, is one possible rendering of the allegorical structure of the 
person under capitalism. There is no space here to flesh out the combinatory 
terms (liberal subject, professional ‘role’, comrade, body), nor is there room 
to explore the ways in which social forms such as gender and race are imbri-
cated with various ‘transversal’ combinations (or mutual exclusions) of the 
respective levels (not to mention the possible rearticulation of the levels in 
spatial or literary terms). I shall conclude simply by observing that, in line with 
Jameson’s emphasis on heterogeneity and differences that relate, the square 
captures something of the discontinuous lived experience – the ‘undisambigu-
ated synonymity’41 – of capitalist societies: the multiple subjective planes on 
which we make ourselves and are, in turn, made. It also implies the necessity 
for some form of coordination across levels in any radical politics worthy of 
the name. Just as Gramsci was deeply concerned with questions of translation 
between languages and contexts – not least (following Lenin) the translatabil-
ity of the Russian Revolution into European countries whose social forma-
tions were utterly distinct – so we might rewrite the productive notions of 
‘transversality’ and ‘laterality’ as conscious efforts to connect subjective figures 
and sites of struggle. In such a scenario, allegory – like Gramsci’s ‘democratic 
40  Albeit, via ‘femonationalism’, women migrant-workers fare better than their male coun-
terparts under neoliberal regimes. See Farris 2012.
41  Jameson 2019, p. 332.
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philosopher’ – would name a collective power of self-organisation and self-
education whose ultimate horizon is proletarian cultural revolution.
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